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We analyze the set of two-qubit states from which a secret key can be extracted by single-copy
measurements plus classical processing of the outcomes. We introduce a key distillation protocol
and give the corresponding necessary and sufficient condition for positive key extraction. Our results
imply that the critical error rate derived by Chau, Phys. Rev. A 66, 060302 (2002), for a secure
key distribution using the six-state scheme is tight. Remarkably, an optimal eavesdropping attack
against this protocol does not require any coherent quantum operation.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
It is known that all quantum correlations can be con-
verted into secret ones, namely, into correlations that
cannot be distributed by local operations and public com-
munication [1]. However, the identification of the precise
quantum correlations (entangled states) that can be con-
verted into a secret key remains an open problem. This
paper focuses on this problem: we wish to determine
which two-qubit states contain distillable secret correla-
tions. More precisely, we aim to characterize the set of
two-qubit states from which a secret key can be extracted
by SIngle-copy Measurements plus ClAssical Processing
(SIMCAP) protocols.
As usual, Alice and Bob are the honest parties will-
ing to communicate secretly and Eve is the adversary
who tries to learn the secret messages. The scenario for
key extraction that we consider is quite similar to that
for entanglement distillation. The honest parties initially
share a large number, N , of copies of a known two-qubit
state ρAB. Instead of distilling entangled bits, or sin-
glets, Alice and Bob’s task here consists in extracting
secret bits. Pure secret and entangled bits are indeed
two different information resources that can be extracted
from quantum states. Notice that in contrast with gen-
eral security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD)
protocols, it is assumed that Alice and Bob know they
share N independent copies of the two-qubit state ρAB.
We restrict our considerations to SIMCAP protocols for
several reasons. First, they do not require any coherent
quantum operation, so they are experimentally feasible
with present day technology. Second, it is interesting to
compare these protocols with those employing coherent
quantum operations performed by Alice and Bob. Fi-
nally, results obtained for quantum states in the SIM-
CAP scenario can be applied to quantum channels and
prepare and measure QKD schemes [2], such as BB84 [3].
In this paper, we consider a slightly improved version
of the SIMCAP protocol with two-way communication
introduced in [4]. We derive a necessary and sufficient
condition any two-qubit state must satisfy for this pro-
tocol to be secure. The sufficiency of this condition is
proved by showing that, if it holds, our protocol enables
extracting a key that is secure against any attack. The
necessity follows from the existence of an explicit eaves-
dropping attack (given below), that breaks the protocol
if the aforementioned condition is not satisfied. Remark-
ably enough, Eve can implement this attack without any
coherent quantum operation. As far as we know, this is
the first necessary and sufficient condition for key distil-
lation from quantum states using a two-way communica-
tion SIMCAP protocol.
II. THE PROTOCOL
As mentioned above, Alice and Bob share N copies of
a known bipartite state ρAB. Given this assumption, the
SIMCAP key distillation protocol consists of three steps:
(i) local measurement on each qubit pair ρAB, (ii) advan-
tage distillation, and (iii) one-way key extraction.
Measurements: Step (i) can be decomposed into the
operations (a), (b), and (c) defined as follows. Opera-
tion (a) is a single-copy filtering operation that Alice and
Bob perform in order to maximize the entanglement of
formation of their state. The operators FA and FB that
characterize this filtering, ρAB → FA⊗FB ρAB F
†
A⊗F
†
B,
are described in [5]. If the filtering fails, the qubit pair
is rejected. If it succeeds, the resulting two-qubit state is
diagonal in the Bell basis (defined in [6]):
ρAB → λ1
[
Φ+
]
+ λ2
[
Φ−
]
+ λ3
[
Ψ+
]
+ λ4
[
Ψ−
]
, (1)
with λi ≥ 0 and
∑
i λi = 1. Throughout this paper
square brackets denote one-dimensional projectors (not
necessarily normalized); e.g., [ψ] = |ψ〉〈ψ|. If ρAB is al-
ready diagonal in the Bell basis, this filtering leaves it
unchanged. Operation (b) is a local unitary transforma-
tion that Alice and Bob apply to the state (1) to ensure
that
λ1 = max
i
λi, λ2 = min
i
λi . (2)
2This is just a permutation of the coefficients λi in (1),
and any such permutation can be achieved using only
local unitaries [7]. One can thus associate to any two-
qubit state ρAB the pair of coefficients (λ1, λ2). The last
operation, (c), consists in measuring each qubit in the
computational basis {|0〉, |1〉}.
These three operations can be seen as a single mea-
surement performed by each of the honest parties, with
outcomes: 0, 1 and reject. After discarding all the in-
stances where the outcome reject is obtained, each of
the honest parties has a list of partially correlated bits.
These two lists do not constitute a shared secret key yet,
because in general they are neither equal nor secret. Our
goal is now to distill them to a secret key [steps (ii) and
(iii) above].
Advantage distillation: Step (ii) is a reconciliation
scheme introduced by Maurer in [8] that uses two-way
communication. Within this scheme, each of the honest
parties transforms blocks of M bits into a single bit. By
doing that, Alice and Bob map their initial lists of bits
into shorter, more secret and correlated ones. To achieve
this goal, Alice randomly chooses M bits from her list of
accepted outcomes, and Bob takes their M counterparts
from his list:
A1, A2 . . . AM
B1, B2 . . . BM . (3)
Next, Alice generates a secret random bit sA, computes
the M numbers Xi := (Ai + sA) mod 2, and sends the
M -bit string
X1, X2, . . . , XM (4)
through the insecure but authenticated public channel.
Bob then adds bitwise (mod 2) this string to his list,
B1, B2, . . . BM . If he obtains the same result sB for the
M sums, i.e., if (Bi+Xi) mod 2 = sB for i = 1, 2, . . .M ,
he keeps the bit sB and communicates its acceptance to
Alice. Otherwise, the two parties reject the M bits. The
bits sA and sB are the result of the advantage distillation
process (ii). A large number of pairs (sA, sB) constitute
the input of (iii).
One-way key extraction: Step (iii) consists of the one-
way communication procedure given by Devetak and
Winter in [9]. It concerns the situation where Alice has
a classical random variable correlated to Bob and Eve’s
quantum states, and it enables (when possible) trans-
forming these classical-quantum-quantum (CQQ) corre-
lations into a secret key with maximal rate. In our case,
the honest parties have the classical random variables
(sA, sB) correlated with Eve’s quantum states (CCQ cor-
relations), this being a particular case of the scenario con-
sidered in [9]. Thus, their techniques immediately apply.
Having discussed the protocol with some detail, we
now state our main result: A secret key can be extracted
from a two-qubit state ρAB by the protocol above if and
only if its associated weights (λ1, λ2) satisfy
(λ1 − λ2)
2 > (1− λ1 − λ2)(λ1 + λ2) (5)
The sufficient and necessary statements of this result are
proved in sections III and IV, respectively.
III. SECURITY PROOF
Let us first prove the security of this protocol. As
usual, we conservatively assume that Eve has a large
quantum system that is a purification of the whole state
ρ⊗NAB . Note that all purifications of Alice and Bob’s state
are equivalent, since they only differ by a local unitary
operation on Eve’s Hilbert space. Without any loss of
generality, the state of the three parties can be taken to
be |ΨABE〉
⊗N , where |ΨABE〉 is a purification of ρAB,
i.e., ρAB = trE [ΨABE ]. After the filtering operation (a),
the tripartite state is still pure, hence, Eve holds the sys-
tem that purifies the Bell-diagonal state (1). The three
parties thus share many copies of the state
FA⊗FB⊗IE|ΨABE〉=
√
λ1|Φ
+〉AB|1〉E+
√
λ2|Φ
−〉AB|2〉E
+
√
λ3|Ψ
+〉AB|3〉E+
√
λ4|Ψ
−〉AB|4〉E . (6)
After step (i), Alice and Bob are left with classical data,
whereas Eve could still hold a quantum system. The
correlations they share are described by the state (up to
normalization) ∑
x
[x]AB ⊗ [ψx]E , (7)
where x = 00, 01, 10, 11, and
|ψ00/11〉 =
√
λ1|1〉 ±
√
λ2|2〉,
|ψ01/10〉 =
√
λ3|3〉 ±
√
λ4|4〉. (8)
Notice that the above vectors are non-normalized. After
step (ii), Eve has herM (four-dimensional) quantum sys-
tems as well as the information that the honest parties
have exchanged through the public channel. In partic-
ular, Eve has the M -bit string (4). If she performs the
unitary transformation
Ui = [1]E + (−1)
Xi [2]E + [3]E + (−1)
Xi [4]E (9)
to her i-th system (i = 1 . . .M), up to normalization the
tripartite state becomes∑
x
[x]AB ⊗ [ψx]
⊗M
E . (10)
After this transformation, the tripartite state (10) be-
comes completely uncorrelated to (4). The rest of the
protocol is also independent of (4), and this information
is no longer useful. Hence, all the correlations among
Alice, Bob and Eve before step (iii) are described by the
state (10).
It was proven in [9], that the secret key rate one can
achieve with one-way communication (K→) when Alice
holds a classical system satisfies:
K→ ≥ I(A : B)− I(A : E), (11)
3where I(X : Y ) is the mutual information referred to the
state (10), and is defined in [11]. After some algebra, the
following equality can be obtained
I(A : B)− I(A : E) = 1− h(ǫB)
−(1− ǫB)h
(
1− ΛMeq
2
)
− ǫB h
(
1− ΛMdif
2
)
, (12)
where
ǫB =
(λ3 + λ4)
M
(λ1 + λ2)M + (λ3 + λ4)M
,
Λeq =
|λ1 − λ2|
λ1 + λ2
, Λdif =
|λ3 − λ4|
λ3 + λ4
, (13)
h(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x), and the subscript
‘eq’ (‘dif’) refers to the outcome A being equal to (dif-
ferent from) B. It can be checked that if condition (5) is
satisfied, there exists a sufficiently largeM such that the
right-hand side of (11), i.e., Eq. (12), is positive. Thus, a
secret key can be extracted from ρAB with our SIMCAP
protocol. This completes the security proof. In the next
section we prove that condition (5) is tight.
IV. OPTIMAL EAVESDROPPING ATTACK
Let us present a particular eavesdropping attack that is
optimal in the sense that it breaks our SIMCAP protocol
if (5) is not satisfied. This attack is similar to that in [12].
Without loss of generality, we assume that in step (iii)
the public communication is sent from Alice to Bob. In
the attack, Eve makes a guess, sE , for Alice’s outcome
sA in such a way that sE and sB are independent when
conditioned on sA. That is, the probability distribution
for these random variables P (sA, sB, sE) satisfies
P (sB, sE |sA) = P (sB|sA)P (sE |sA). (14)
To accomplish this, she first waits until step (ii) is com-
pleted [recall that at this stage the three parties share the
state (10)], and performs the two-outcome measurement
defined by the projectors
Feq = [1]E + [2]E , Fdif = [3]E + [4]E, (15)
on each one of her M systems. According to (10), all
M measurements give the same outcome. If Eve obtains
the outcome corresponding to Feq, the tripartite state
becomes (up to normalization)
[00]AB ⊗ [ψ00]
⊗M
E + [11]AB ⊗ [ψ11]
⊗M
E (16)
In order to learn sA, she must discriminate between the
two pure states ψ00 and ψ11. It was proved in [14] that
the minimum error probability she can achieve is
P error =
1
2
−
1
2
√
1− c2M , (17)
where c is the overlap between the states. Applying this
formula to (16), we obtain the error probability in guess-
ing sA
ǫeq =
1
2
−
1
2
√
1− Λ2Meq . (18)
Similarly, if Eve obtains instead the outcome correspond-
ing to Fdif , the error probability ǫdif is given by (18) with
the substitution Λeq → Λdif .
At this point, Eve’s information consists of sE (her
guess for sA) as well as the outcome of the measure-
ment (15). To ensure (14), Eve proceeds as follows. From
(2), it can be seen that Λdif ≤ Λeq, which implies that
ǫdif ≤ ǫeq. Then, when she obtains the outcome corre-
sponding to Fdif , she increases her error until ǫdif = ǫeq.
She achieves this by changing the value of sE with some
probability. After this operation the tripartite proba-
bility distribution is of the form (14). Additionally we
know that P (sB|sA) and P (sE |sA) are binary symmetric
channels with error probability ǫB in (13) and ǫeq in (18),
respectively. It is proven in [8] that in such situation the
one-way key rate is
K→ = h(ǫeq)− h(ǫB), (19)
which is non-positive if
ǫeq ≤ ǫB . (20)
Let us finally prove that this inequality holds for all
values of M if condition (5) is not satisfied. Define
z = λ1 + λ2. The range of interest is 1/2 ≤ z ≤ 1,
since no secret key can be extracted from a separable
state [13] and a two-qubit state is entangled iff λ1 > 1/2.
After some algebra, one can prove the inequality
1
2
−
1
2
√
1−
(
1− z
z
)M
≤
(1− z)M
zM + (1− z)M
, (21)
where M is any positive integer. The right-hand side
of (21) is equal to ǫB, whereas the left-hand side is an
upper bound for ǫeq. This bound follows from the in-
equality (λ1−λ2)
2/z2 ≤ (1− z)/z, which is the negation
of (5). In summary, if condition (5) is not satisfied, no
secret key can be distilled with the considered protocol.
Since we have previously proven the sufficiency of (5),
the attack we have considered is optimal and the secu-
rity bound (5) is tight for our SIMCAP protocol.
It is worth analyzing the resources that this optimal
eavesdropping attack requires. First of all, we note that
Eve does not need to perform any coherent operation, i.e.,
she can make do with single-copy measurements. This
follows from the fact that the minimum error probabil-
ity (17) can be attained using an adaptive discrimination
protocol consisting of projective measurements on each
one of the M copies [15]. Therefore, in order to break
our key distillation protocol, what Eve does need is the
ability to store her quantum states until after listening
4to the (public) communication between the honest par-
ties in step (ii). That is to say, she requires a quantum
memory. If Eve can neither perform coherent operations
nor have a quantum memory, the necessary and sufficient
condition for the success of this protocol is λ1 > 1/2 [4],
which is the entanglement condition for two-qubit states.
V. FINAL REMARKS
In this paper, we have considered the problem of se-
cret key extraction from two-qubit correlations. We have
derived the necessary and sufficient condition for posi-
tive key rate using an improved version of the SIMCAP
protocol of Ref. [4]. If this condition does not hold, we
have shown that an optimal attack can be implemented
without any coherent quantum operation. In this case,
and contrary to what happens in [16], quantum memory
gives a significant advantage to Eve.
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FIG. 1: Security bounds for Werner states of two qubits,
Eq. (22). If Alice and Bob can apply coherent operations, all
entangled states are distillable to a secret key through entan-
glement distillation. Here, we show the security of entangled
Werner states under SIMCAP protocols up to λ1 ≈ 0.58.
Whether the gap in the figure can be closed remains an open
question.
In view of the above, the first natural question one
can ask concerns the optimality of the SIMCAP protocol
discussed here. In other words, does condition (5) charac-
terize the set of all distillable two-qubit states with SIM-
CAP protocols? Let us argue that this could indeed be
the case. Recall that our protocol consists of three steps:
measurements followed by two-way and one-way reconcil-
iation. Concerning the third step, we employ the optimal
protocol [9]. Therefore, the weak part in the reconcilia-
tion process corresponds to the two-way communication
step. Here, we have used the standard advantage dis-
tillation protocol. Notice that its coherent version, usu-
ally called recurrence, combined with one-way hashing
techniques, enables the distillation of pure-state entan-
glement from any entangled two-qubit state [17]. As far
as the measurement part is concerned, the single-copy fil-
tering operation (a) is optimal in terms of entanglement
enhancing [5]. Moreover, we have numerically checked
that for Bell diagonal states of the form (2), measuring
in the computational basis is optimal within our recon-
ciliation scheme. All this suggests that the necessary and
sufficient condition (5) could very well be completely gen-
eral. If this were the case, there would exist some two-
qubit entangled states for which extracting secret bits
would require coherent operations (see Fig. 1). In other
words, there would be quantum states whose secrecy con-
tent would not be distillable by SIMCAP protocols.
Since our protocol does not require any coherent quan-
tum operation on Alice and Bob’s side, our results can be
related to the security of prepare and measure schemes,
such as BB84 [3]. Indeed, every state can be associ-
ated to a channel, and then, the sequence of measure-
ments defines a QKD prepare and measure protocol.
Note however that in a fully general security proof for
these schemes, one must not make any assumption on the
global state shared by Alice and Bob. That is, one must
consider the most general correlated state of N pairs of
systems compatible with the single-pair description. In
our analysis, however, it is assumed that Alice and Bob’s
state consists of N copies of the same two-qubit state. In
the prepare and measure picture, this means that Eve in-
teracts individually with the quantum states sent to Bob;
they are the so-called collective attacks [10]. The recent
results of [10] suggest that Eve gains no advantage by in-
troducing correlations among the pairs of systems shared
by Alice and Bob. If this were proved correct, our results
would indeed provide a tight, general security proof for
a whole family of schemes and channels. Note also that
while the sufficient part of our security condition relies
on the N copies hypothesis, the necessary part does not.
It simply senses the existence of an attack that can be
applied to any protocol equivalent to ours.
Finally, it is interesting to compare our results with
previous security proofs using two-way communication
for QKD schemes [18]. When the attack described above
is applied to the six-state protocol, Eve prepares N in-
dependent copies of a two-qubit Werner state:
ρAB = λ1
[
Φ+
]
+
1− λ1
3
([
Φ−
]
+
[
Ψ+
]
+
[
Φ−
])
. (22)
Condition (5) shows that a secure key extraction is not
possible with our protocol if the error rate is larger than
QBER = 2
1− λ1
3
= 0.2764. (23)
This is precisely the same value as obtained by Chau in
[18]. Indeed, his protocol is equivalent to ours. The at-
tack we have presented proves that, unless another two-
way reconciliation technique is employed, this critical er-
ror rate cannot be improved, i.e., is tight.
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